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ABSTRACT
Reductions in firing costs are often advocated as a way of increasing the dynamism of labour markets in both
developed and less developed countries.  Evidence from Europe and the U.S. on the impact of firing costs has,
however, been mixed.  Moreover, legislative changes both in Europe and the U.S. have been limited.  This paper,
instead, examines the impact of the Colombian Labour Market Reform of 1990, which substantially reduced
dismissal costs.  I estimate the incidence of a reduction in firing costs on worker turnover by exploiting the temporal
change in the Colombian labour legislation as well as the variability in coverage between formal and informal sector
workers. Using a grouping estimator to control for common aggregate shocks and selection, I find that the exit
hazard rates into and out of unemployment increased after the reform by over 1% for formal workers (covered by
the legislation) relative to informal workers (uncovered).  The increase of the hazards implies a net decrease in
unemployment of a third of a percentage point, which accounts for about one quarter of the fall in unemployment
during the period of study.
Keywords: Firing costs, worker turnover, exit hazard rates, grouping estimators, selection biases, labour market
reform.
JEL Classification Codes: J41, J42, J63, J64, J65.3
I. Introduction
Job security regulations are often considered to impose substantial rigidities on the ability
of firms to adjust their employment levels over the business cycle.  These regulations are
equivalent to taxes on job destruction that reduce firms’ incentives not only to dismiss but also to
hire new workers.  Thus, job security provisions reduce both dismissals and hirings and, hence,
the exit rates into and out of unemployment.  Due to the effect on hirings, it is often argued that
the strict job security requirements in Europe are in part to blame for the high unemployment
rates in this continent.  However, a priori, job security provisions could either decrease or
increase unemployment, depending on whether the regulations have a greater effect on the exit
hazard rates into or out of unemployment.
1
Moreover, since the effects of firing costs on employment and unemployment are
difficult to estimate, the net impact of job security provisions has not been determined
empirically either.  In fact, the empirical evidence on the net effects of firing costs is ambiguous.
Using cross-sections, Grubb and Wells (1993) find that stricter provisions are negatively
correlated with employment, while Bertola (1990) finds no relation between the strictness of job
security provisions and medium and long run employment.  These mixed results are not
surprising, given that cross-section studies are subject to omitted variables biases, simultaneity
problems, and possible endogeneity of the regulations.
To overcome some of these problems, a number of studies have instead relied on pooled
time-series and cross-section data and panel data.  Nonetheless, the results from these studies are
                                                       
1 Theoretically, the net effects of hirings and firings on employment and unemployment are very sensitive to the
assumptions of the model.  For instance, the net effects of firing costs depend crucially on whether the entry-exit
margin is considered.  Using a general equilibrium framework with firm entry and exit, Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993) find that an increase in firing costs reduces employment, because firing costs cause firms to be more cautious
not only about hiring but also about entry, thus, also reducing the need for job destruction.  On the contrary,4
also mixed.  Lazear (1990) uses pooled time-series and cross section data for 22 OECD countries
over 29 years and finds that severance payments and advance notice requirements reduced
employment.  Dertouzos and Karoly (1993) use pooled time-series and cross-section data from
the U.S. and find a reduction in employment in those states in the U.S. that introduced exceptions
to the employment-at-will doctrine.  In contrast, using a panel of 8,000 retail firms in the U.S.,
Anderson (1993) finds higher employment levels in firms subject to higher adjustment costs, due
to the experience-rating feature of the U.S. unemployment insurance system.  While these studies
are not subject to some of the problems present in cross-section studies, they are subject to
selection biases.  For example, these estimates would be biased due to selection if high-turnover
firms choose to locate in states where job-security provisions are less strict, or if high-turnover
firms already located in states with high firing costs simply choose to exit the market.
In this paper, I develop a simple model of labour demand to illustrate how job-security
provisions and changes in these provisions may induce self-selection.  The model highlights the
selection biases that may be present in the above estimates of the net impact of firing costs.
Moreover, the model also shows how compositional changes may bias standard grouping
estimators downwards.  Consequently, below I discuss the necessary identifying assumptions for
grouping estimators to be consistent in the presence of a time-variant composition.
Contrary to the above studies, which examine the effects of firing costs in Europe and the
U.S., this paper exploits a large policy change in Latin America.  I explore the impact of the
Colombian Labour Market Reform of 1990, which substantially reduced firing costs, on worker
turnover (exit rates into and out of unemployment).  The identification strategy consists of
exploiting the temporal change in the labour market legislation together with the variability in
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Bentolila and Bertola (1990) consider a partial equilibrium model with a monopolistic firm and find that5
coverage across groups.  Thus, the strategy relies on comparing the exit rates of groups of
workers affected differently by the labour market reform, but subject to the same non-treatment
shocks.  However, as suggested above, the reform may induce reallocation across groups thus
biasing grouping estimators. To obtain consistent grouping estimators an additional “reform” is
required.  The additional identifying assumption needed is that selection into groups be affected
by some exogenous factor unrelated to those factors causing self-selection.
2
The empirical analysis uses repeated cross-sections from the Colombian National
Household Survey (NHS).  The NHS data provides information on tenure, last unemployment
spell, demographic characteristics, industry, city, and indicators of whether the employee is
covered by labour market legislation.  The empirical analysis shows that after controlling for
composition changes, the reduction in firing costs increased the hazard rate out of employment
of covered workers by up to 1.06% and the hazard rate out of unemployment of covered workers
by up to 1.7% relative to uncovered workers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In Section II, I describe the legislative changes
introduced by the Colombian labour market reform of 1990.  In Section III, I present a simple
model that explains the compositional changes induced by a reduction in firing costs.  In Section
IV, I describe the conditions required on grouping estimators for the identification and estimation
of firing cost effects.  In Section V, I describe the data and present estimates of the incidence of
firing costs on the exit rates into and out of unemployment.  In Section VI, I conclude by
explaining the implied net effect of the reform on unemployment.
II. The Colombian Labour Market Reform
                                                                                                                                                                                  
employment increases slightly with firing costs, because the firing effect dominates the hiring effect.
2 An alternative approach would consist of choosing groups that are affected differently by the reform, but whose
composition cannot change in response to the reform.  This is the ingeneous approach taken in Blundell, Duncan,6
The view that job security regulations hamper the flexibility of labour markets has driven
a number of European countries to introduce labour market reforms, in the hope of reducing
unemployment.  However, most efforts in this direction have been limited to the introduction of
temporary contracts.  In contrast, in the United States, legislative changes have moved towards
stricter regulations, but have been limited to the introduction of exceptions to the employment-at-
will doctrine.
More recently, a number of Latin American countries have introduced large changes in
their labour legislation towards greater flexibilization.  These large policy changes in Latin
America, thus, provide substantial temporal variation to study the effects of firing costs.  In
particular, this paper considers the Colombian Labour Market Reform of 1990.
In 1990, Colombia introduced a labour market reform that substantially reduced the cost
of dismissing workers.  The one major policy change introduced by the reform was a uniform
reduction in severance payments.
3  The reduction in severance payments lowered the costs of
hiring and firing workers hired after 1990 and covered by the legislation. Thus, the reform should
not have affected the self-employed, family workers, and domestic workers, all of whom are
exempted from severance payments.  In addition, workers hired in the underground or informal
sector are not protected by labour legislation and, thus, should not have been affected by the
labour market reform.  During the period of study 51.3% of all workers were employed in the
informal sector and were thus not covered by job security provisions.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
and Meghir (1998).  However, there are no natural groups that fulfill these conditions in the context considered here.
3 Moreover, the reform introduced other changes in the legislation that also contributed to lowering firing costs.
First, while prior to 1990 the legislation allowed the use of fixed-term contracts for a minimum duration of a year,
the reform extended the use of fixed-term contracts for less than a year.  Second, the 1990 reform widened the legal
definition of ‘just cause’ dismissals to include economic conditions.  Third, while the reform increased the cost of
‘unjustly’ dismissing workers with more than ten years of tenure, it also eliminated the ability for these workers to
sue for backpay and reinstatement.7
Prior to the reform, employers were mandated to pay severance of one month per year
worked based on the salary at the time of separation (9.3% of the salary at the time of
separation). From this amount, any nominal withdrawals made by the worker from his severance
pay were subtracted,
4 but the employer paid for those withdrawals in real terms. These legislated
firing costs introduced a corridor of inaction over which firms would prefer not hire nor to fire,
thus, reducing employment adjustments over the business cycle.
5  The reform, however, reduced
these dismissal costs.  After 1990, employers were, instead, required to make a monthly
contribution of 9.3% of the present salary to a capitalised fund, which would be accessible to the
worker in the event of separation.  The change in the legislation reduced severance payments for
three reasons. First, it eliminated the additional cost implied by the fact that, prior to the reform,
the severance pay was based on the salary at the time of separation rather than on the current
salary during each month.  Second, the change in the legislation reduced severance payments by
eliminating the possibility for employees to withdraw funds for investments in education and
housing which would only be credited to the employer in nominal terms at the time of
separation.
6  Finally, the replacement of severance payments at the time of firing for a monthly
contribution turned severance payments into a deferred compensation scheme and should had
                                                       
4 Prior to the 1990 Labor Market Reform, workers could withdraw money out of their severance payment before job
break-up to use for investments in education and housing.
5 This can be seen in a simple two-period model, where firms maximise their expected present discounted profits,
f(l1) - wl1 + E{ qf(l2) - wl2 - C max (l1 - l2 , 0) },
and where q is a demand shock in the second period, which is distributed uniformly between [ q ,‘q ].  Firms hire if
qf´(l1)>w, they fire if w>qf´(l1)+C, and thus they do not adjust their employment if the demand shock q˛[qmin, qmax],
where qmin”(w-C)/f´(l1) and qmax ” w/f´(l1).  Hence, it is easy to show that the probability of remaining inactive,
G(qmax) - G(qmin), increases as firing costs increase.
6 Previous studies have estimated that the additional cost from paying severance based on the salary at the time of
separation, together with the real cost of withdrawals to the employers, implied an additional 35% of the average
cost of severance payments in the manufacturing sector before 1990 (Ocampo, 1990).8
reduced the probability of inaction and increased turnover rates after 1990 for all workers
covered by the legislation.
7
Moreover, the reduction of severance payments and other firing costs decreased the
propensity of firms to hire in the underground sector.  Prior to the reform, 44.84% of all workers
were employed in the formal sector while after the reform 51.05% of all workers were employed
in the formal sector.
8  The reduction in firing costs increases expected formal profits, thus,
inducing firms to hire formally rather than in the underground sector.  Moreover, with
heterogeneous firms, the reduction in firing costs must had been accompanied by a change in the
composition of the two sectors, which is also likely to affect turnover in different sectors.  The
next section presents a model that shows how firing costs can affect self-selection of firms into
the formal and informal sectors.
III. A Model of Selection into Formal and Informal Sector Activity
This section presents a model of formal and informal sector activity in which the size and
composition of the formal and informal sectors are endogenously determined.  In particular, the
model shows how the size and composition of the two sectors are affected by changes in job
security legislation.
The formal and informal sectors are distinguished by two characteristics.  First, formal
firms comply with labour market regulations (e.g., severance pay, indemnities for unjust
dismissals), while informal firms do not comply with regulations.  Consequently, formal firms
have higher adjustment costs due to the legislated firing costs.  Second, because formal firms are
                                                       
7 In the context of the two-period model in footnote 5, this change implied an increase in both qmax and qmin, but a
greater increase in qmin, since qmax ” 1.093*w/f´(l1) and qmin ” [1.093*w-(C-SP)]/f´(l1) after the reform.  Thus, this
change should had decreased the corridor of inaction, G(qmax) – G(qmin).
8 The NHS provides information about whether one’s employer pays social security contributions.  This information
is a good proxy of formality, as it provides an indication of whether the employer complies or not with labour
legislation.9
subject to unjust dismissal legislation, they must accumulate sufficient evidence before firing to
avoid having to pay indemnities for ‘unjust’ dismissals.  The presence of unjust dismissal
legislation raises monitoring costs substantially for formal sector firms and they, thus, prefer
paying efficiency wages rather than monitoring costs.
9  In contrast, informal firms can monitor
cheaply and they pay reservation wages. Hence, the payment of efficiency wages introduces an
additional source of adjustment costs.  In particular, formal firms prefer not to adjust their
employment because the expectation of being fired increases the efficiency wages that have to be
paid to motivate workers.
A. Assumptions
Firms and workers are risk neutral, infinitely lived, and face a discount factor b.
Firms
(F1) The revenue of firm j is Rjt=qtf(etljt), where the price, qt, is an i.i.d. random variable
drawn from a density G(q), et are the efficiency units and ljt is employment at firm j at time t.
(F2) Formal firms pay legislated firing costs, C, while informal firms do not.
(F3) Firms can obtain a monitoring technology at a cost s that allows to perfectly monitor
workers.
10 Without this technology firms can monitor imperfectly, as each firm j has a
probability of catching a shirker qj , where qj is uniformly distributed between q and‘q.
Workers
(W1) Workers can exert effort e=1, or they can shirk, e=0.
(W2) Workers employed in sector S=F,I and firm j at time t face a separation rate xSjt.
                                                       
9 Formal firms may also prefer paying efficiency wages rather than monitoring costs if they are subject to minimum
wage legislation.
10 The cost of purchasing this technology for formal sector firms is s=¥.10
B. Solution of the Model
Firms determine the wage to be paid in each sector.  Given these wages, firms then make
hiring and firing decisions.  Finally, given the wages and turnover patterns in each sector, each
firm decides whether to produce in the formal or informal sector.
11
Wage Determination
Since the cost of the monitoring technology is excessive for formal firms, these firms pay
efficiency wages.  That is, a firm j producing in the formal sector pays a wage to satisfy the no-
shirking condition (NSC):
VEt
Fj = wFjt – 1 + b[ (1-xFjt) EtVEt+1
Fj + xFjt EtUt+1 ] ‡
VSt
Fj = wFjt + b[ (1-xFjt)(1-qj) EtVSt+1
Fj + ( (1-xFjt)qj + xFjt ) EtUt+1 ],
where (1-xFjt)(1-qj) is the probability that a worker does not get fired for shirking nor for
exogenous reasons, and (1-xFjt)qj is the probability that a worker gets fired only for shirking.  The
wage that satisfies the NSC with equality is:
wFjt = aFj + bFj / (1-xFjt-1),
where, aFj = (Et-1Ut - bEt-1Ut+1) + (1-1/qj) and bFj = 1/ bqj.
The informal sector can perfectly monitor workers, and hence, informal sector firms pay
workers their opportunity cost:
wI = aI = (Et-1Ut - bEt-1Ut+1) + 1.
The probability of being fired by firm j in the formal sector, xFjt, is,
xFjt = max { (lt
Fj  - lt+1
Fj) / lt
Fj , 0 },
and the probability of being fired in the informal sector, xIt, is,
xIt = max { (lt
I - lt+1
I) / lt
I , 0 }.
Given the firing probabilities, the total cost of hiring formal workers is,11
c(lt
Fj,lt-1
Fj) = wFjt lt
Fj = aFj lt
Fj + bFj max { lt-1
Fj, lt
Fj },
and the total cost of hiring informal workers includes the cost of monitoring, s, and is,
c(lt
I ) = (wI  + s)lt
I = (aI  + s)lt
I.
Hiring and Firing Decisions
At the end of time t, formal firms choose their employment at time t+1 as to maximise
their expected discounted profits:
V(lt
Fj ,qt+1 ) = max qt+1f(etlt+1
Fj) - c(lt+1
Fj,lt
Fj) + bEt V(lt+1
Fj,qt+2),
where et = 1.  Thus, hiring and firing decisions are determined as follows.
Case 1F: If qt+1f´(lt 
Fj) + bEt ¶V(lt
Fj,qt+2) / ¶lt
Fj > aFj 
 + bFj ￿ lt+1
Fj > lt
Fj, firm j hires new workers
at time t+1.  In particular the firm hires iff,
qt+1 >‘q




Case 2F: If qt+1f´(lt
Fj) + bEt ¶V(lt
Fj,qt+2) / ¶lt
Fj + C < aFj ￿ lt+1
Fj < lt
Fj, firm j fires workers at time
t+1.  In particular, firm j fires iff,
qt+1 < q
 Fj = { aFj - C - bEt¶V(lt
Fj,qt+2 ) / ¶lt
Fj } / f´(lt
Fj).
Case 3F: If aFj 
 + bFj  > qt+1f´(lt
Fj) + bEt ¶V(lt
Fj,qt+2) / ¶ lt
Fj > aFj - C  ￿ lt+1
Fj = lt
Fj, then at time t+1
firm j does not hire nor fire.  In particular, firm j does not hire or fire iff:
‘q
 Fj  > qt+1 > q
 Fj,
and the probability that firm j remains inactive is G(‘q
Fj)-G(q
 Fj).




Proof: All proofs are in Appendix A.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
11 For simplicity, it is assumed that workers are allocated randomly to the formal and informal sectors.12
Informal firms’ hiring and firing decisions can be determined similarly.  The present
discounted profits of informal firms are:
V(lt
I,qt+1 ) = max qt+1f(etlt+1
I) - c(lt+1
I,lt
I) + bEt V(lt+1
I,qt+2),
where et = 1.  Hiring and firing is determined as before by the following cases.
Case 1I: If qt+1f´(lt
I) + bEt ¶V(lt
I,qt+2) / ¶ lt
I > aI 
 + s ￿ lt+1
I > lt
I, informal firms hire new workers
at time t+1.  In particular, informal firms hire iff,
qt+1 > ‘q
 I = { aI + s - bEt ¶V(lt
I,qt+2 ) / ¶lt
I } / f´(lt
I).
Case 2I: If qt+1f´(lt
I) + bEt ¶V(lt
I,qt+2) / ¶ lt
I  < aI + s ￿ lt+1
I < lt
I, informal firms lay off workers at
time t+1.  In particular, informal firms fire iff,
qt+1< q
 I = { aI + s - bEt¶V(lt
I,qt+2)/¶lt
I } / f´(lt
I).
Case 3I: If aI
 + s > qt+1f´(lt
I) + bEt ¶V(lt
I ,qt+2 ) / ¶ lt
I > aI + s ￿ lt+1
I = lt
I.  However, since the LHS
and the RHS of the inequality are the same, informal firms always adjust their employment in
response to shocks.
Choice of Sector
Each firm j can choose whether to produce in the formal or informal sector.  Firms
producing in the formal sector pay firing costs and efficiency wages.  Firms producing in the
informal sector do not comply with labour legislation, but they pay a constant cost, s, to monitor
workers.  Since firms differ in terms of the increase in difficulty of firing shirkers if they switch
from the informal to the formal sector, some firms find it more profitable to hire formally and
others informally.
A firm j produces in the sector that maximises its present discounted profits.  The present















Fj,qt+1) = max { qt+1f(lt+1 
Fj) - (aFj + bFj )lt+1
Fj + bEt V
e(lt+1
Fj , qt+2 ) }, and
V
fire (lt
Fj ,qt+1 ) = max { qt+1f(lt+1 
Fj) - aFj lt+1
Fj + bEt V
e(lt+1
Fj , qt+2 ) }.
The probability of catching a shirker for the firm j that is just indifferent between producing in
the formal or the informal sectors is, q
crit, and is determined by the following condition:
￿q˛q(hire) V
hire (lt
Fj,qt+1) + ￿q˛q(inactive) V
inactive (lt








I,qt+1) = ￿q˛q(hire) V
hire (lt





Fj,qt+1)  = V
fire (lt
Fj,qt+1) = max { qt+1f(etlt+1
I) - (aI  + s)lt-1
I  + bEt V(lt+1
I ,qt+2 ) }.
Result 2: Firms with qj ˛ [q
crit,‘q] produce formally, while firms with qj ˛ [q , q
crit] produce
informally.
Figure 1 in Appendix A shows the expected present discounted profits of formal and
informal firms as a function of an inverse measure of the difficulty of firing shirkers.  The figure
shows the cut-off value that makes a firm j indifferent between producing formally and
informally.  Moreover, Result 3 shows how this cut-off value changes in response to changes in
firing costs.
Result 3: A decrease in the firing costs, C, decreases the cut-off probability of catching a shirker,
q
crit.  As the cut-off probability decreases, the size of the formal sector increases and the average
probability of inaction in the formal sector increases.
Result 3 is illustrated in Figure 2 in Appendix A.  The reduction in firing costs shifts the
expected profits of formal firms.  This shift increases the number of firms producing in the
formal sector and decreases the number of firms producing informally.  Moreover, the shift
generates a compositional change that decreases the average probabilities of firing and hiring.14
The net effect of this compositional change is to reduce the average probability of inaction of
formal firms, without changing the response of informal firms to demand shocks.
The model shows that a reduction in firing costs increases firing and hiring and, thus, the
exit rates into and out of unemployment.  However, in the model a reduction in firing costs also
induces sector reallocations that reduce turnover in the formal sector.  Thus, this model suggests
that the impact of firing costs on turnover is likely to be smaller when the reduction in firing
costs also induces compositional changes.  The next section discusses the identification of firing
cost effects, using the Colombian Labour Market Reform, when there are compositional changes.
IV. Identification Strategy
A. A Grouping Estimator
According to the theory laid out above, the reduction in firing costs introduced by the
Colombian labour market reform of 1990 should have affected firms’ decisions to both fire and
hire and, thus, the exit rates into and out of unemployment.  To examine the effects of the
reform, an exponential hazard model is used to estimate exit rates out of employment and out of
unemployment,
h( sit | Xit,q qit ) = exp { b bXit + g reformit+ q qit },
where sit is the employment or unemployment spell of person i in period t, Xit is a vector of
observed characteristics of person i in period t and q qit is a vector of  unobservable factors
affecting turnover behaviour of person i in period t.  The unobservable factors may capture either
common aggregate shocks or unobservable heterogeneity across groups of workers.  Failing to
account for both common shocks and unobservable heterogeneity would in general introduce
biases.  In order to control for the presence of aggregate shocks, I exploit the cross section
variation between covered and uncovered workers.  That is, the estimation relies on comparing15
otherwise similar groups of workers who were affected by the same aggregate shocks, but who
were affected differently by the labour market reform.
The problems in estimating the effect of the reforms on turnover are the following.  One
must control for: (1) the presence of common aggregate shocks, (2) for the correlation between
unobserved heterogeneity and firing costs, and (3) for selection into the covered and uncovered
sectors.
Suppose workers can be categorised into two groups g={F, I} (i.e., formal and informal,
or covered and uncovered), each sampled for at least two periods.  The following identifying
assumptions allow controlling for (1) and (2).
Assumption A.1.1: q qit = q qg + q qt.
Assumption A.2.1:  [Dh
gt |q qit]² „ 0,
where,
[Dh
gt |q qit] = h(sit | Xit, gi x t, gi, t) - h(sit | Xit, gi, t),
and h(sit | Xit, gi x t, gi, t) = h(sit | Xit, gi x t, gi, t, q qit ) and h(sit | Xit, gi, t) = h(sit | Xit, gi, t, q qit ).
Assumption A.1.1 states that a group component and an additive time component can capture the
unobservable factors.  This assumption, thus, says that, given the observables, the difference in
the average turnover between the two groups remains unchanged over time. Consequently, this
assumption does not require for the two groups to respond similarly to aggregate shocks, but
rather for the response of the two groups to aggregate shocks to be similar over time.  The
second assumption states that after controlling for unobservables, turnover must change
differentially over time across groups.  A labour market reform between the two periods, which
reduces firing costs and affects the two groups differently, would guarantee identification of the
firing cost effect.16
Considering the case with two groups and two-time period yields the following difference
of differences estimator of the effect of firing costs on turnover:
Dh
formal x post90 = h(sit|Xit,formali x post90t,formali,post90t,g2 = g2￿) - h(sit|X,formali,post90t,g2 = 0)
= exp{b bº Xit + g0ºformali + g1ºpost90t + g2ºformalixpost90t}-exp{b bºXit + g0ºformali + g1ºpost90t },
where b bº  and g gº are the estimates of the parameters of the model.  Because the exponential
hazard is a non-linear model, the estimated coefficient g2￿ cannot be interpreted as a marginal
effect.  Instead, since the reform variable (formali x post90t) is discrete, the marginal effect of the
reduction in firing costs is estimated by predicting two hazards, one with the interaction term set
equal to one and the other with the interaction term set equal to zero.  The firing cost effect on
turnover is, then, estimated as the average difference in the two hazards, over the sample of post-
1990 workers in the formal sector.  Moreover, with exponential hazards the sample counterpart











gt = 1 /‘s
gt and  D‘s 
gt = D[‘s 
post90 -‘s 
pre90 ] 




B. Possible Selection Biases
A potential problem with the approach above is that it assumes that selection into the
formal and informal sectors is constant over time and, thus, selection effects can be fully
accounted for by the group effect.  Nonetheless, as shown by the model in Section III, the
changes in firing costs introduced by the reform are, in fact, likely to induce sector reallocations.
In particular, sector reallocations are likely to cause firms with higher adjustment costs to self-
select into the formal sector and thus to reduce average turnover in this sector.  If this were the
case, sector reallocations would introduce a downward bias in the firing cost effect and the17
grouping estimator considered above would, thus, provide a lower bound of the effects of firing
costs on turnover.
The presence of selection effects that change over time would imply that unobservables
are a more general function of time and group.  To control for the possibility that unobservables
may change over time across groups, the identifying assumptions above are modified as follows:
Assumption A.1.2: q qit = q qg + q qt + q qgt.
Assumption A.2.2:  [Dh




 = h( sit | Xit, p(gi) x t, p(gi), t ) - h( sit| Xit, p(gi), t )
= h( sit| Xit,p(gi) x t,p(gi),t,q qit ) - h( sit| Xit,p(gi),t,q qit ),
and p(gi = formali) = Prob (g
* > 0) = Prob( dZit + e > 0 ) = F(dZit) and Cov (q qit, Zit) = 0.
Assumption A.1.2 states that unobservables are a function of a group effect, a time effect, and a
joint time-group effect.  The time-group effect implies the presence of changes in the
composition of groups over time.  Thus, one can no longer use the approach above to capture the
effect of firing costs on turnover, because the difference in the hazards would now capture both
the direct effect of the reform from a reduction in firing costs as well as an indirect composition
effect.  Assumption A.2.2 states that turnover must vary differentially across groups over time,
over and above any turnover variation induced by changes in the composition of the two groups.
An extra “reform” is, thus, required to control for the composition effect.  This assumption
requires the use of an exogenous source of variation that affects selection into the formal and
informal sectors but that is independent of the unobservables.  The estimator that imposes these18
assumptions is implemented, as before, by estimating the average difference in the hazards, but
instrumenting for selection into the formal and informal sectors.
V. Empirical Analysis
This Section examines the impact of the Colombian Labour Market Reform of 1990,
which reduced firing costs substantially, on the hazard rates of formal workers out of
employment and out of unemployment.
A. Data
The data to analyse the effects of the reform on the exit rates out of employment and out
of unemployment are drawn from the Colombian National Household Surveys (NHS) for June of
1988, 1992, and 1996.  The June NHS’s were administered in seven Colombian metropolitan
areas.
The benefit of using the June waves of the NHS is that these include special modules on
informality that allow to separate workers between formal workers (covered by the reform) and
informal workers (uncovered).  As discussed in the previous Section, the possibility of separating
workers into these two groups helps to control for common shocks that may have affected the
turnover of all workers.  The June waves have information on whether a worker’s employer pays
social security taxes or not.  This information provides a good proxy of formal and informal
sector employment, as it indicates whether the employer complies or not with labour
legislation.
12  Moreover, the June waves also include information about whether the worker is
                                                       
12 Below, I also use the standard definition of informality to separate the sample into covered and uncovered groups
and to check the robustness of the results to the definition of informality being used.  According to this definition,
formal workers are wage-earners employed in firms with more than ten employees, and informal workers are wage-
earners employed in firms with less than ten employees, family workers, domestic workers and self-employed
workers (except for professionals).  The benefit from using this definition is that the last three categories of informal
workers (family, domestic and self-employed workers) are exempt from severance payments.19
permanent or temporary, which allows distinguishing the effects of the extension of temporary
contracts by the reform on the turnover of permanent and temporary workers.  The Surveys also
include information on gender, age, marital status, educational attainment, number of
dependants, city and sector of employment, all of which are used to control for differences in
turnover behaviour across individuals.
Table 1 in Appendix B presents summary statistics of formal and informal workers,
before and after the reform.  Columns 1 and 2 present the characteristics of formal workers and
columns 3 and 4 present characteristics of informal workers, before and after the reform.  The
two groups are remarkably similar both before and after the reform with regards to gender and
age composition, marital status, and household size.  The two groups differ, however, on their
educational composition.  The formal sector has a greater share of workers with university
education than the informal sector, and this difference increased slightly after the reform.
These summary statistics suggest that the raw differences in the turnover patterns of
covered and uncovered workers may reflect, in part, differential turnover behaviour of the two
groups due to differences in composition.  For this reason, the use of formal hazard models in the
analysis below, which allows controlling for individual characteristics, will be crucial in
identifying the effect of the labour market reform.  Moreover, Table 1 shows an increase in the
share of formal workers after 1990 (this share was 44.84% before and 51.05% after 1990)
indicating that the reform could have induced changes in the composition of the two sectors and
suggesting the potential presence of selection biases.
B. Tenure and Unemployment Spells, Before and After the Reform
Average Tenure20
The framework above suggests that, if compositional changes were unimportant, the
reform should have encouraged more firings and, thus, should have increased the hazard rate out
of employment and reduced the average tenure of formal workers (covered by the reform)
relative to informal workers (uncovered).
13
Table 2 in Appendix B presents the average tenure of the covered and uncovered groups,
before and after the Colombian Labour Market Reform of 1990.  The first row corresponds to the
average tenure prior to the reform, the second row corresponds to the average tenure after the
reform, and the third row corresponds to the differences.  The last row provides the sample
difference of differences estimate of the effect of the reform on tenure, D‘s
gt.  As expected, the
average tenure of formal workers decreased relative to the average tenure of informal workers
between 14.88 and 15.84 weeks after the reform.  Moreover, the sample difference of differences
estimates of the effect of the reform on the hazards out of employment indicate that the hazard
out of employment went up between 7.18% and 7.54% for formal workers relative to informal
workers after the reform.
Unemployment Duration
The theory above also suggests that, if compositional changes were unimportant, the
reform should have encouraged more hirings and, thus, should have increased the hazard rate out
of unemployment and reduced the average unemployment spells of formal workers (covered by
the reform) relative to informal workers (uncovered).
14
                                                       
13 In addition, the reform should have increased hirings, the hazard out of unemployment and the fraction of
workers with short tenures (those just hired) and, thus, should have decreased the average tenure among formal
workers after the reform.
14 As indicated above, the reform should have also increased the hazard out of employment, thus, increasing the
fraction of unemployed workers with short spells (those just fired) and decreasing the average unemployment spells
among unemployed formal workers after the reform.21
Table 3 in Appendix B presents the sample difference of differences estimates for
unemployment spells, D‘s
gt.
15  The results show that the average unemployment spell of workers
whose spell ended with a formal sector job decreased between 3.08 and 4.12 weeks relative to
the average unemployment spell of workers whose spell ended in an informal sector job.  In
addition, the sample estimates of the effect of the reform on the hazard rate out of unemployment
increased between 7.36% and 10.72% for formal workers relative to informal workers.
C. Hazard Models
As it is possible that tenure and unemployment spells as well as hazard rates changed
after the reform due to changes in the characteristics of workers and firms, this Section considers
formal duration models.  As described in the previous section, the following exponential hazard
model is considered,
h( sit | Xit,q qit ) = exp{ b bXit + g0 formali + g1 post90t + g2 formali x post90t },
where Xit is a 1 x k vector of regressors, and b b is a k x 1 vector of parameters.  In the
specifications considered below, the vector Xit includes: age, education, sex, marital status,
number of dependants, the city where the person lives, and industry of employment.   These
variables help to control for observable differences between formal and informal workers that
affect their turnover behaviour.  The specification also includes the following variables to
estimate the effect of job security legislation on the exit rates out of employment and out of
unemployment.  A variable formal is included that takes the value of one if worker i is formal
(covered by the legislation) and zero if worker i is informal (uncovered).  This variable controls
for constant differences between these two groups. One would, thus, expect g0 to be negative
                                                       
15 Unemployed workers are defined as formal if the job subsequent to their spell was in the formal sector and as22
since the dismissal of formal workers is more costly than that of informal workers, both before
and after the reform.  In addition, the specification includes a variable post90 that takes the value
of one for post-1990 observations and the value of zero for pre-1990 observations.  The
coefficient on the post90 dummy controls for non-treatment shocks affecting the turnover
behaviour of all workers after 1990.  More importantly, an interaction term of the post90 and the
formal variables is included in the estimation.  A test of the impact of the labour market reform is
a test that the coefficient on the interaction term, g2, is different from zero.  This test considers
whether workers covered by the legislation changed their turnover behaviour relative to
uncovered workers after 1990.  In particular, if one expects for the reduction in firing costs to
have increased turnover, then one would expect for g2 to be positive.  However, as described in
the previous section, because the exponential hazard is a non-linear function, the coefficient g2
cannot be interpreted as the marginal effect of the reform.  Instead, the marginal effect of the
reform is the average of the difference between the hazard with the interaction variable set equal
to 1 and the hazard with the interaction set equal to zero, Dh
formal x post90, over the sample of
workers affected by the reform.
Table 4 in Appendix B shows the results of the estimation of the exit hazard rates out of
employment.  Column (1) estimates the model without any covariates.  The coefficient g2 is
0.083 in this specification and significantly different from zero at conventional levels.  Column
(2) includes the post-1990 dummy, the formal dummy, the interaction term, and all of the
covariates mentioned above, except for the industry dummies.  The results show that, after
controlling for observables, the coefficient on the interaction term falls to 0.0582 and continues
to be significant at the 1% significance level.  Estimating the marginal effect indicates that the
                                                                                                                                                                                  
informal if the job subsequent to their spell was in the informal sector.23
reduction in firing costs introduced by the reform increased the exit rates out of employment of
formal workers by 0.85% relative to informal workers.
16  To control for the possibility that
formal sector jobs were affected more by shocks after the reform because these jobs are in
industries receiving different shocks after 1990, Column (3) includes industry dummies as
additional covariates in the estimation.  The results do not change substantially and, furthermore,
the predicted turnover response for the covered group increases to 0.9% and continues to be
significant at the 1% level of significance.
17  Column (4) includes interactions with a permanent
dummy to examine whether it is the extension in the use of temporary contracts or the reduction
in severance payments that accounts for the increase in turnover.  The results show that while the
hazard out of employment increased by 1.22% for temporary formal workers relative to informal
workers, the hazards out of employment also increased by 0.83% for permanent formal workers
relative to informal workers.
18  Column (5) includes an alternative definition of informality to
check for the robustness of the results to the choice of groups.  This specification uses the
standard definition of informality described above.  The results are very similar.  The hazard out
of employment increased by 0.97% for formal workers relative to informal workers and the
effect is significant at the 1% level.  Finally, to control for time-variant groups, Column (6) uses
the estimator proposed in Section III, in which the formal variable is instrumented with firm size
                                                       
16 Exit hazards out of employment are likely to have increased after the reform both because of increased layoffs and
quits.   Quits are likely to increase after the reform because the of the increased availability of alternative job
opportunities.  Unfortunatelly, however, the data does not allow to distinguish between layoff and quit hazard rates.
17 In addition, another specification was estimated which included an interaction of the formal x post90 interaction
with the various industry dummies and the results did not change substantially.  Moreover, while one would have
expected tradable industries to have been affected differently by shocks after 1990 due to trade liberalization, this is
not confirmed by the data.
18 The possibility of hiring temporary workers would be expected to generate a dual labour market within the firm,
in which temporary workers are used as a margin of adjustment to demand fluctuations and allow firms to insulate
permanent workers.  Thus, if the extension in the use of temporary contracts allowed by the reform was alone
responsible for the increased turnover in the formal sector, then we would have expected a decrease in the hazards of
formal permanent workers and not an increase as it was observed.24
and the skill requirement of the industry of employment.  As expected, the marginal effect
increases to 1.06% after controlling for selection bias and it remains significant.
Table 5 in Appendix B includes the results of exponential hazards out of unemployment.
Column (1) shows that the exit hazard out of unemployment increased for formal workers
relative to informal workers after the reform, when no controls are included.  Columns (2) and
(3) show that the coefficient on the interaction term increases, after controlling for observables,
and the predicted turnover response of the covered group to the reform ranges between 0.77%
and 0.84%.  Column (4) shows that the escape rate out of unemployment increased for both
temporary and permanent workers covered by the reform, but the hazard out of unemployment
was a higher for those who took permanent jobs.  Column (5) shows that the predicted response
for the covered group increases to 1.7% when using alternative groups.  Finally, Column (6)
shows that the hazards out of unemployment increased to 1.61% after controlling for selection
bias.
VI. Conclusion
The Colombian labour market reform of 1990 provides an interesting quasi-experiment to
analyse the effects of a reduction in firing costs.  This paper exploited the temporal change in the
Colombian labour legislation in 1990, which reduced severance payments, together with the
variability in coverage between formal and informal sector workers to identify the effects of
firing costs on turnover.  Using micro-data from Colombia, I find that, after controlling for
changes in composition, the hazard rate out of employment increased 1.06% and the hazard rate
out of unemployment increased 1.61% for formal workers relative to informal workers after the
reform.25
The steady-state conditions of the model above, together with these estimates, indicate
that the reform was responsible for a decrease in the unemployment rate of a third of a
percentage point or a fourth of the total drop in unemployment between the late 1980’s and the
middle of the 1990’s.
19  The reform contributed to reducing unemployment both because it
generated greater flows out of unemployment than into unemployment, and because it induced a
reallocation towards the formal sector, which has lower hazards out employment and greater
hazards out of unemployment than the informal sector.  The importance of this reallocation
effect, thus, indicates that welfare considerations of labour market reform should not only
recognise the efficiency gains from greater mobility and the benefits from lower unemployment
that may be brought about by a reform, but also the welfare gains of compositional changes
towards better jobs.
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Appendix A
Proof of Result 1:
Cases 2F and 3F show that formal firms choose not to hire with probability G(‘q
 Fj),
while they choose not to fire with probability (1- G(q
 Fj)).  The intersection of these two
probabilities is the probability of not hiring and not firing.  Since‘q
 Fj > q
 Fj, there is a
non-null intersection of these two probabilities.  A reduction in the firing cost reduces the
probability of not hiring,
¶‘q
 Fj / ¶C = bG(q
 Fj) / f´(lt
F)[ 1-b(G(‘q
 Fj)-G(q
 Fj)) ] > 0,
as well as the probability of not firing,
¶q
Fj /¶C = - (1+bG(q
 Fj))(1-bG(‘q
 Fj)) / [1-b ( G(‘q
 Fj)-G(q
 Fj) ) ] <0
Thus, a reduction in firing costs reduces the probability of inaction,
¶ [ G(‘q
 Fj)-G(q
 Fj) ] / ¶ C > 0.r
Proof of Result 2:
The RHS of the indifference condition (i.e., the expected discounted profits of informal
firms) is independent of qj, while the LHS (i.e., the expected discounted profits of formal
firms) increases in qj at a decreasing rate:
¶V
e(lt
Fj,qt+1) / ¶qj = (1-b) (1- G(q
 Fj)) / qj² > 0,
¶²V
e(lt
Fj,qt+1) / ¶qj² = - (1-b) (1- G(q
 Fj)) / qj³ - (1-b) g(q
 Fj) [¶q
 Fj / ¶ qj]/ qj² < 0,
as,
¶q
 Fj / ¶ qj = b[1 + (1+b) G(‘q
 Fj) ( 1-bG(q
 Fj) ) ] / ( 1+bG(q
 Fj) ) > 0.
Moreover,
  lim  V
e(lt
Fj,qt+1) = - ¥.r
 qjﬁ0
Proof of Result 3:
Completely differentiating the indifference condition with respect to C yields:
¶q
crit / ¶C = (q
crit )² G( q
Fj ) / (1-b) ( 1 - G( q
Fj ) ) > 0,
Also,
¶‘q
 Fj /  ¶q
crit = - [1 - b ( 1-G(q
 Fj) ) ] /   [ 1+bG(q
 Fj) ]< 0
and
¶q
 Fj / ¶q
crit =  b [ 1 + (1+b) G(‘q
 Fj) ( 1-bG(q
 Fj) ) ] / [ 1+bG(q
 Fj) ] > 0,
so that,
¶ [ G(‘q
 Fj) - G(q
























Figure 2: Effect of a Change in Firing Costs on qcrit
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Appendix B
Table 1: Basic characteristics of formal and informal workers
(according to affiliation to the social security system), before and after the reform
Formal Informal
Variable Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
Share of  Total Employment 44.84 % 51.05 % 55.16 % 48.95 %
Share of Men 68.69 % 64.95 % 69.6 % 67.56 %
Share of Married Workers 69.79 % 73.38 % 68.1 % 72.17 %
Average No. of Dependants 0.81 0.72 0.80 0.78
Average Age 35.53 yrs. 35.85 yrs. 36.00 yrs. 36.53 yrs.
Share with Age < 25 yrs. 15.37 % 12.36 % 22.9 % 19.19 %
Share with Age 25-54 yrs. 77.16 % 81.2 % 65.58 % 69.79 %
Share with Age > 55 yrs. 7.46 % 6.44 % 11.52 % 11.03 %
Average Education 8.97 yrs. 9.74 yrs. 6.09 yrs. 6.67 yrs.
Share with Education 0-5
Yrs.
29.46 % 22.35 % 56.24 % 49.17 %
Share with Education 6-10
yrs.
27.52 % 25.0 % 27.45 % 29.26 %
Share with High School
Degree
21.65 % 27.02 % 10.28 % 14.36 %
Share with Education
12-15 yrs.
8.77 % 10.11 % 3.06 % 3.57 %
Share with Education > 16
yrs.
12.59 % 15.51 % 2.97 % 3.64 %
Share of Permanent
Workers
90.66 % 88.84 % 77.64 % 74.5 %32
Table 2: Sample Difference of Differences Estimates of the Effect of




Period Formal Informal Formal Informal
Pre-reform 5.10 4.02 4.82 4.28
Post-reform 4.81 4.04 4.55 4.34
Differences - 0.29 0.02 - 0.27 0.06
Diff’s-n-diff’s - 0.31 years
( = -3.72 months = - 14.88 weeks )
- 0.33 years
( = - 3.96 months = - 15.84 weeks )
Table 3: Sample Difference of Differences Estimates of the Effect of




Period Formal Informal Formal Informal
Pre-reform 7.33 8.73 7.35 8.63
Post-reform 7.6 9.77 7.38 9.72
Differences 0.27 1.04 0.03 1.09
Diff’s-n-diff’s - 0.77 months
( = -3.08 weeks )
- 1.03 months
( = -4.12 weeks )
*Definition 1:
Formal workers are defined as those whose employer pays social security taxes and
informal workers are defined as those whose employer does not pay social security
contributions.
**Definition 2:
This is the standard definition of informality.  Formal workers are defined as wage-
earners employed by firms with more than 10 employees and informal workers are wage-
earners employed by firms with less than 10 employees, family workers, domestic
workers, and self-employed workers.  In Colombia, the last three categories of informal
workers are exempt from severance pay legislation.33
Table 4: Exponential hazard models of employment duration
1 ( n = 55,683 )
Variable (1)
2 (2) (3) (4) (5)
 3 (6)
 4


































































































































Permanent - - - -0.3939
(0.0021)
- -
Formal*Permanent - - - -0.3401
(0.0039)
- -





- - - -0.0062
(0.0045)
- -
City dummies NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry dummies NO NO YES YES YES YES














                                                       
1 The numbers in brackets are asymptotic standard errors.
2 Columns (1)-(4), and (6) use the social security definition of informality.  Formal workers are those whose employers make social
security contributions and informal workers are those whose employers do not contribute to the social security system.
3 This column uses the standard definition of informality.  Formal workers include wage-earners employed by firms with more than 10
employees.  Informal workers include wage-earners employed by firms with less than 10 employees, family workers, domestic workers,
and self-employed workers (except for professionals).
4 This column instruments the formal dummy using the skill requirements of the sector and the size of the firm where the worker is
employed.  While one cannot fail to reject the significance of these variables in the hazards, these are the only variables with information
on firm and sector characteristics which capture firms’ incentives to hire in the formal and informal sectors.34
Table 5: Exponential hazard models of unemployment duration
1 ( n = 55,683 )
Variable (1)
2 (2) (3) (4) (5)
 3 (6)
 4


































































































































Permanent - - - 0.2676
(0.0022)
- -
Formal*Permanent - - - 0.1335
(0.0039)
- -





- - - 0.0208
(0.0046)
- -
City dummies NO YES YES YES YES YES
Industry dummies NO NO YES YES YES YES














                                                       
1 The numbers in brackets are asymptotic standard errors.
2 Columns (1)-(4), and (6) use the social security definition of informality.  Formal workers are those whose employers make social
security contributions and informal workers are those whose employers do not contribute to the social security system.
3 This column uses the standard definition of informality.  Formal workers include wage-earners employed by firms with more than 10
employees.  Informal workers include wage-earners employed by firms with less than 10 employees, family workers, domestic workers,
and self-employed workers (except for professionals).
4 This column instruments the formal dummy using the skill requirements of the sector and the size of the firm where the worker is
employed.  While one cannot fail to reject the significance of these variables in the hazards, these are the only variables with information
on firm and sector characteristics which capture firms’ incentives to hire in the formal and informal sectors.